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ANALYSE COMPAREE DE LA FORMATION ET DES EFFETS DES REGIMES 
INSTITUTIONNELS DE RESSOURCES NATURELLES EN SUISSE 
 
Partant du constat de l'accroissement significatif et généralisé de la consommation des 
ressources naturelles, le projet a pour ambition d'examiner, dans le cas de la Suisse, quels 
sont les types de régimes institutionnels -régimes composés de l'ensemble des droits de 
propriété de disposition et d'usages s'appliquant aux différentes ressources naturelles, de 
même que des politiques publiques d'exploitation et de protection les régulant- susceptibles 
de prévenir des processus de surexploitation et de dégradation de ces ressources. 
Dans le cadre de ce projet de recherche financé par le Fonds national suisse de la recherche 
scientifique (FNRS), il s'agit, dans un premier temps, d'analyser les trajectoires historiques 
d'adaptation et de changements des régimes institutionnels des différentes ressources sur une 
durée d'environ un siècle (1900-2000). C'est l'objet des différents screenings. 
Dans un second temps et à l'aide d'études de cas, ces transformations de (ou au sein des) 
régimes institutionnels sont analysées sous l'angle de leurs effets sur l'état de la ressource. 
L'ambition finale de cette recherche est de comprendre les conditions d'émergence de 
"régimes intégrés" capables de prendre en compte un nombre croissant de groupes d'usagers 
agissant à différents niveaux (géographiques et institutionnels) et ayant des usages de plus en 
plus hétérogènes et concurrents de ces différentes ressources. 
Le champ empirique de la recherche porte plus particulièrement sur cinq ressources que 
sont: l'eau, l'air, le sol, le paysage et la forêt. 
 
 
 
VERGLEICHENDE ANALYSE DER GENESE UND AUSWIRKUNGEN 
INSTITUTIONELLER RESSOURCENREGIME IN DER SCHWEIZ 
 
Ausgehend von der Feststellung, dass die Konsumraten natürlicher Ressourcen weltweit 
stetig steigen, untersucht das Projekt, ob und welche institutionellen Regime in der Schweiz 
einer Übernutzung und Degradation von solchen Ressourcen entgegenwirken. Solche 
Regime bestehen aus der eigentumsrechtlichen Grundordnung (Eigentumstitel, Verfügungs- 
und Nutzungsrechte) und der Gesamtheit der ressourcenspezifischen öffentlichen Nutzungs- 
und Schutzpolitiken. 
In einem ersten Schritt zeichnen wir nach, wie sich die institutionellen Regime verschiedener 
Ressourcen über eine Dauer von ungefähr hundert Jahren (1900-2000) angepasst und 
entwickelt haben. Diese überblicksartigen historischen Analysen bilden den Inhalt der 
verschiedenen Screenings. 
In einem zweiten Schritt werden mittels Fallstudien die Wirkungen von Veränderungen 
eines institutionellen Regimes auf den Zustand der Ressource evaluiert. 
Mit dem Projekt soll das Verständnis dafür erhöht werden, unter welchen Bedingungen 
„integrierte Regime“ entstehen können: Wie kann es zu institutionellen Regimen kommen, 
welche die zunehmend heterogenen und konkurrenzierenden Nutzungen einer steigenden 
Anzahl von Nutzergruppen aus verschiedenen geographischen und institutionellen Ebenen 
berücksichtigen? 
Als empirische Beispiele stehen in diesem vom Schweizerischen Nationalfonds zur 
Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung (SNF) finanzierten Projekt die fünf natürlichen 
Ressourcen Wasser, Luft, Boden, Landschaft und Wald im Zentrum. 
 
  
 
 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FORMATION AND OUTCOMES OF RESOURCE 
REGIMES IN SWITZERLAND 
 
In the context of a significant and widespread increase in the consumption of natural 
resources, the aim of this project is to determine, in the case of Switzerland, which type of 
institutional regime (the property and uses rights pertaining to the different natural resources 
as well as the public policies regulating their exploitation and protection) would most 
effectively prevent the overexploitation and degradation of these resources. 
In the first stage of this project, financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation, we will 
analyse how previous institutional regimes evolved over a period of one hundred years 
(1900-2000). Several screenings will be devoted to this issue. 
The next stage of our research will be devoted to the analysis, based on several case studies, 
of these modifications from the point of view of their impact on the state of a given natural 
resource. 
The final aim of this research project is to understand the conditions necessary for the 
elaboration of an "integrated regime" which would take into account the growing number of 
users at various levels (both geographical and institutional), as well as the increasingly 
varied and competing forms of consumption of these resources. 
This study will focus on five main resources: water, air, soil, landscape and forests. 
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Abstract 
This paper presents a comparative analysis of the three different hunting systems which have 
historically emerged in Switzerland : (1) a state monopoly system, (2) a license based system and (3) 
a leasing based system. The research design starts from the conviction that such a territorial 
proximity of these contrasted systems constitutes a highly relevant opportunity to develop a 
comparative strategy within a continuum going from a pure Leviathan solution to a partly self-
organized solution. 
The paper aims to address the following questions : 
· What are the strengths and the weaknesses of the three different systems with regard to the 
sustainable management of the natural resource in question ? 
· What can we learn from the case of fauna resource management concerning the contemporary 
challenges which common pool resources (CPR) encounter in western countries ? 
· What are both the potentialities and obstacles, on the way to a self-organized management of the 
resource in such a case ? 
The findings of this research are the followings: 
· CPR self-governance solution is very unlikely to emerge in the Swiss context, because state 
intervention is necessary to overcome the challenges of wildlife management which are: the 
absence of vital appropriators’ dependence on the resource; the progressive development of local 
situations of underutilization; the heterogeneity of users leading to multilevel conflicts; the 
mobility of the resource units; and finally the interdependence of ecosystems. 
· However, the historical overview demonstrated the interesting potentials for co-operative 
solutions, the renting system, a partly self-organized system, having considerable capacities to 
adapt to such radical changes in the constitution of the resource 
 
Résumé 
Cet article présente une analyse comparée des trois différents systèmes de chasse qui ont émergé 
historiquement en Suisse: (1) le système de monopole d’Etat (chasse interdite), (2) le système de 
chasse à permis et (3) le système de chasse à affermage. Le design de recherche est fondé sur la 
conviction que la proximité territoriale de systèmes de chasse aussi contrastés constitue une 
opportunité particulièrement intéressante de comparaison de ces différents systèmes situés sur un 
continuum allant du monopole d’Etat à un système partiellement auto-organisé (système 
d’affermage). 
L’article traite plus particulièrement les trois questions suivantes: 
· Quelles sont les forces et les faiblesses des trois différents systèmes sous l’angle de la gestion 
durable de la ressource? 
· Que pouvons nous apprendre, à partir du cas de la gestion de la faune, en ce qui concerne les 
enjeux de la gestion des ressources naturelles possédées en commun (common pool resources) au 
sein des pays occidentaux industrialisés? 
· Quelles sont à la fois les potentialités et les obstacles à l'émergence de solutions auto-organisées 
de la ressource dans un tel contexte? 
Les conclusions de la recherche sont les suivantes: 
· L'émergence d'une gestion auto-organisée de la faune sauvage est très improbable dans le 
contexte helvétique dans la mesure où une intervention étatique est indispensable pour répondre 
aux défis que sont (1) l'absence de dépendance vitale des appropriateurs vis-à-vis de la ressource, 
(2) l'émergence de situations locales de sous-exploitation de la ressource, (3) le caractère 
hétérogène des différents groupes d'usagers de la ressource menant à des conflits multi-niveaux, 
(4) la mobilité de la ressource et, finalement, (5) le caractère interdépendant des écosystèmes 
implique une gestion coordonnée de la ressource en même temps que de son espace vital élargi. 
· Toutefois, l'analyse historique a montré l'intérêt, dans l'optique d'une gestion durable de la 
ressource, des solutions de cogestion telles que celle de la chasse affermée, système ayant de 
meilleures capacités d'adaptation aux changements radicaux qu'a connu l'état de la ressource. 
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O° Introduction 
 
Since the 15th or 16th century, in Switzerland, wildlife has been a common-pool resource 
under state-property regime. It constitutes what we can call a régale d'Etat1. The 
organization of hunting became a legal competence of the states (cantons) which at that time 
constituted the Swiss Confederation. Throughout this period until the XIXth century, the 
states regulated and organized the practice in a very varied and uncoordinated way. During 
the second part of the XIXth century, the dramatic decrease in wildlife population, a direct 
consequence of this uncoordinated regulation of hunting practices, led to a strong 
intervention by the new Federal (central) state. 
According to the Federal Constitution of 1874, the Federal state is entitled to legislate on the 
regulation of hunting, on the protection of a number of endangered species, as well as of big 
game in the alpine regions. However, the property rights on the game (the hunting régale) 
remain the privilege of the states and not of the Federation. This monopoly is of fiscal 
nature2. Thus, only the cantons (the states) are entitled to receive fees resulting from the sale 
of hunting rights (Petitpierre-Sauvain 1999; Zimmerli 1951)3. As we can see, unlike a 
number of other European states such as France, Germany, Austria, Belgium or the 
Netherlands, there is, in Switzerland, no relation between landed property and hunting 
rights. Game or wildlife is, like in the US (Buck 1998), not the property of the landowner. 
In this resource regime, institutionalized through the coming into force of the federal law of 
1925 (revised in 1986), the Federation is responsible for determining what can be hunted 
(definition of the protected species), when, where and how (that is, with which means, types 
of weapons and munitions). The central state also fixes the relevant sanctions. The states are 
responsible for defining who is entitled to hunt as well as for choosing the hunting system 
(licence or renting) and organizing and monitoring the practice in the state. The states are 
also free to organize monitoring through game-keepers. 
This division of responsibilities between the states and the federation has led historically to 
the progressive development of various hunting systems in the country: 
 
1° a licence-based system (chasse à permis) is present in sixteen cantons of central and 
western Switzerland : the state administration monitors the resource as well as the progress 
of hunting and fixes animal quotas for hunters who can hunt on the entire territory of the 
state; 
 
2° a renting-based system (chasse affermée) is present in nine cantons of the northeastern 
part of the country : for a period of six or eight years, the state leases the different hunting 
territories to local associations of hunters and delegates to them the responsibility for 
monitoring and managing the fauna on their territory. The cantonal administrations, 
however, fix the quotas of the animals to be shot at the state level. As we will see, this 
system resembles to a certain extent a self-organized regime. 
 
                                                 
1 The formal (legal) situation concerning property rights is however somewhat more complex. Wildlife and 
game do not belong to anybody (res nullius), but the state, here the cantons (the states), have a “ regalian ” 
right over the resource's appropriation (the hunting régale) and are, consequently, exclusively entitled to 
receive fees resulting from the exercise of this right. But, once shot/dead, game animals belong to the 
hunter who killed them. 
2 Most of the hunting administrations are integrated in the states public finance departments. 
3 In 1917, an attempt to institute federal property rights (a federal hunting régale) in order to finance social 
security encountered massive opposition and was abandoned. 
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3° a state monopoly system (chasse interdite) in one canton (Geneva) : since 1974, hunting 
is completely forbidden and state gamekeepers are responsible for the management of 
wildlife and its living territory. 
 
In view of the coexistence of such contrasted resource management systems within the same 
country, the paper aims to address the following three questions : 
- what are the strengths and the weaknesses of the three different systems with regard to the 
sustainable management of the resource ? 
- what can we learn from the case of wildlife resource management with regard to the 
contemporary challenges which common-pool resources encounter in the western developed 
countries ? 
- what are both the potentialities and obstacles in the perspective of a self-organized 
management of such a resource ? 
Finally, the two central objectives of the paper consist on the one hand, in pointing out the 
characteristics of the resource, as well as the requirements of its management, that, in the 
Swiss context, render the development of a collective action towards self-organizing wildlife 
management - i.e. without state intervention - very unlikely. On the other hand, by focusing 
on the lessons learned from the renting system, the paper also examines the conditions and 
the potentialities of cooperation between state administration and local self-organized 
arrangements. 
The paper is divided into five parts: 
In the first part, I briefly describe the three systems, focusing on their main features and 
respective peculiarities in connection with the organization of hunting and the management 
of the wildlife resource. 
In the second part, the three systems are classified regarding to the four (classic) types of 
property regime that are: private property, state property, common property and open access 
(res nullius) (Bromley 1992). This classification enables the different hunting systems to be 
located on a continuum between state property regime and common property regime. A 
comparison of the characteristics of the internal organization of the different systems will 
lead to a discussion of the strengths and the weaknesses of each system. 
In a third part, a brief analysis of the available national statistics regarding the evolution of 
wildlife populations and hunting practices during the last 30 years (1968-1998) highlights 
the contrasted impacts, outcomes and "performances" of the three different systems. 
In the last part of the paper, various attempts to interpret, explain and assess these contrasted 
impacts and outcomes are developed. 
The systematic confrontation of the three hunting systems with the eight design principles of 
long enduring self-organized CPR regimes developed by Elinor Ostrom will allow pointing 
out some of the obstacles to the development of pure self-organized solutions, as well as, by 
extension, suggesting some explanations to the contrasted outcomes highlighted through the 
hunting statistics. Three explaining hypothesis are developed focusing on: (1) the physical 
characteristics of the resource, (2) the role of ideas, knowledge and the scientifization of 
wildlife management, (3) the increasing importance of interpolicy coordination within the 
resource regime as a result of the increasing heterogeneity of the resource uses. 
In the conclusion, I try to draw some lessons from the case of wildlife concerning the 
question "how much autonomy should a common-pool regime have?" 
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1° Switzerland's three hunting systems4 
 
A. THE LICENCE SYSTEM 
The basic principle of this system consists in the possibility for all the inhabitants of a state5, 
who have passed an appropriate exam, to hunt a certain quota of game animals fixed by an 
administrative and political decision on most of the state territory, with the exception of the 
federal hunting reserve (called districts francs), during accurately delimited periods of the 
year. 
The state territory is generally divided, depending on the size of the canton, in 10 to 15 
districts, each monitored by an official game-keeper. His job consists in monitoring the 
hunters operating in the district placed under his jurisdiction, as well as the state of wildlife. 
One of the most important aspects of his mission consists in fact in producing trustworthy 
data and empirical knowledge concerning the fluctuations of the wildlife population living in 
his district. Game keepers are the most significant contributors to the state wildlife statistics6: 
verifications and systematic observation are regularly made in the field, and specific records 
are kept for the most mobile species. 
Using this information, the state consultative hunting commission7 meets once a year, before 
the beginning of the hunting season in order to fix: the price of the licence8, the length of the 
various hunting periods according to the species9, the quotas of the different species 
available for each hunter10, as well as some special conditions concerning more noble and 
rare species11. 
The annual game quota is proposed by this commission and adopted or modified (very 
rarely) by the responsible minister in the state executive. The quotas are fixed on the basis of 
quantitative as well as qualitative information collected and analyzed by the state hunting 
administration, with the help, in certain cantons, of a wildlife biologist. In the practice 
however, changes in the quotas allocation per hunters has been proved to be very difficult to 
realize, hunters being very conservative and attached to their habits and privileges. 
In fact, the most remarkable development in some advanced states during the last 5 years 
specifically concerns the development, in collaboration with wildlife biologists, of various 
innovative techniques in recording, monitoring and planning of wildlife populations. Here 
are some interesting examples: 
 
- In order to tackle the structural problem of the mobility of the resource affecting wildlife 
management, a group of neighboring cantons from the central and western part of the 
country are developing a new concept of "interstate management program" for the most 
                                                 
4 The elements prensented here are the result of a collective empirical inquiry carried out in 1998 in the 
framework of the teachings of Prof. Peter Knoepfel (IDHEAP) on environmental policy (Nahrath, 
Rosenkranz, Tille, 1998). 
5 It is alo possible to buy a licence and hunt in a state other than the one of domicile. 
6 But hunters do also contribute to this statistic to the extent that they have the obligation to inform the hunting 
administration within an interval of 72 hours every time they shoot an animal. 
7 This commission is usually composed of representatives from (1) the state administration (hunting, forest, 
police), (2) the cantonal hunting associations, (3) other actors concerned (nature protection associations, 
representatives from agriculture, biologists, the communes). 
8 This price is relatively stable, between CHF 800.- and 1'000.- (about USD 500.- to 600.-) 
9 Usually between one or two months a year in autumn, sometimes winter. 
10 The definition of these quotas can be very precise indicating the sex and approximate age of the animal to be 
shot. 
11 For example, the right to shoot an ibex (reintroduced at the beginning of the XXth century in the Swiss alps) 
is attributed following the toss principle. 
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mobile species (for example, red-deer and roe). Such a program requires set of data that is as 
reliable as possible, as well as substantial monitoring means. In this respect, some problems 
have recently emerged within the collaboration with the canton of Lucerne, participating in 
the program and practicing the renting system without any game-keeper12. 
 
- Following the objectives of the latest federal hunting law of 1986, and in order to be able to 
manage wildlife not only with the aim of protecting the minimal game stock for the hunters, 
but also in an attempt to achieve sustainable protection of biodiversity, the canton of Bern 
(probably the most innovative of the country13) has developed very sophisticated planning 
methods. Of more particular interest, is the attempt to manage the resource not only in a 
quantitative perspective, but also in a qualitative one. Planning efforts focus on the capacity 
to intervene on the spatial distribution of wildlife. Models of mobility are designed in order 
to make predictions on the spatial and morphological evolution of the live-stock. 
In order to better tackle this problem of the spatial distribution of wildlife, the same 
administration developed a cartographic concept allowing all the sources of wildlife 
disturbance on the state territory to be spatially indexed. The first group of disturbances that 
have been analyzed are the ones caused by tourist activities in the alpine regions. By 
developing this concept, the desired aim in the future, is to be able to better organize the 
cohabitation of wildlife and human activities within the living territory of the former. 
 
- Last but not least, the artificial reintroduction of lynx during the 1970's as well as the 
natural return of wolves14 has led to the development of a national program (called KORA) 
supported by the ministry of environment in order to manage the presence of these two 
predators. Despite the emergence of very strong opposition from hunters as well as from 
sheep-farmers (lynx and wolves have been killed despite the fact that they are strongly 
protected by the federal law), this program is particularly interesting because it is based on 
the idea of a possible reemergence of a process of "natural" wildlife regulation by predators. 
In fact, the analysis of the effects of the lynx's reintroduction in the western and, 
progressively, central part of the country has shown that it has a very positive impact on the 
spatial distribution of the live-stock (i.e. on biodiversity) and contributes thus to facilitating a 
sustainable management of the forest. 
 
Once their quota is attributed, hunters are allowed, in the licence system, to hunt all over the 
state territory. They can organize themselves in small groups that should not exceed four 
persons and are authorized (in some states) to exchange their quotas within the group. 
                                                 
12 Data furnished by the states with renting systems are very probably less reliable: unexplained variations 
between the annual records are much more frequent in this system than in the licence one. 
13 Bern is also one of the biggest cantons (territorially) and possesses the second biggest wildlife stock in 
Switzerland: about 20%. 
14 It seems that, contrary to the assertions of the hunters who claim that wolves are purposely imported by 
some groups of ecologists, wolves are naturally migrating through the Alps from South to North and are 
coming into Switzerland from Italy and France. Unfortunately for them (the wolves), they are arriving in a 
region, the canton of Wallis, where hunting is a very popular and lively activity and where hunters and 
livestock farmers (farmers are all hunters) constitute a social and to a certain extent political force that 
render respect of the federal jurisdiction concerning the absolute protection of wolf, a little uncertain.  
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The absence of any possibility for the state as well as for the local communities (communes, 
local hunters) to exclude an appropriator from access to the resource15, as well as the right to 
hunt almost everywhere on his own state territory, or even to buy this same right for a 
neighboring canton are considered by the advocates of the licence system, as constituting 
fundamental "democratic" and "popular" rights. 
As a consequence of this political impossibility to limit the number of hunters in this hunting 
system, the licence system has long been considered as more "game consuming" then the 
renting one. 
Thus, very early (1876) and in order to prevent an excessive depletion of the resource and to 
better manage the relation between the stock and the yield of the resource, the Federal 
government forced the licence's alpine cantons to agree to the creation of protected areas on 
their territory functioning as game reserves (called districts francs fédéraux and réserves 
cantonales de chasse) thus providing an absolute protection of the "capital" of the resource 
(Zimmerli 1951b). The main idea was that, in such a situation, only strong state-controlled 
intervention would be able to keep under control the depletion process engendered by the 
impossibility to intervene on the number of hunters. These hunting reserves still exist today. 
They have however been progressively integrated as an instrument of an emergent 
encompassing nature protection policy. They however still constitute a central masterpiece 
of the licence system in the absence of which, the system would probably not have been able 
to survive. 
 
B. THE RENTING SYSTEM 
The renting system is characterized by a totally different basic principle. This latter consists 
in the idea that the basic unit of a hunting system is not the individual hunter, but the local 
association. The local association rents a hunting territory (an affermage) from the commune 
on which the territory is located. As the number of affermages (hunting territories) is limited, 
the number of local associations and consequently of hunters is, contrary to the licence 
system, also limited16. 
The links between the members of the affermage are very strong and the expenses and 
benefits are shared between all the members of the association. Thus for example, game 
animals that are shot do not formally belong to the hunter, but to the hunting association. 
Admission or exclusion are subject to the approval of all members of the hunting 
association. Access to the resource is thus dependent on two different conditions: (1) to have 
successfully passed the state exam and (2) to be accepted as a member of one of the 
affermage associations. 
The renting contract between the commune and the hunting association lasts between 6 and 8 
years. At the end of this period the contracts are reattributed by the commune (sometimes 
through the system of selling by auction). Experience has shown that there is very little 
uncertainty in the process of the reattribution of the affermages. A general and consensual 
agreement prevails most of the time17. Nevertheless, opportunities for an open competition 
between associations do formally exist. 
The hunting association is accountable to the canton and the commune for the use and 
management of the hunting territory as well as of the wildlife living within it. More 
                                                 
15 The only possibility to exclude someone from the access to the resource is the mechanism of the exam that 
one should succeed in order to be entitled to buy a licence. But this mechanism is   largely acceptable in the 
hunters‘ view, in the sens that it is considered as respecting the democratic or "republican" principle 
consisting on selecting the appropriators depending on their intrinsic competences, that is independantly 
from any criteria of social, local or political appartenance. 
16 The number of members an association accepts depends on the size of the affermage. 
17 Even though, there are every time when the affermages are reattributed, some cases that goes to the court. 
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particularly, the association is responsible for monitoring the resource (statistics, qualitative 
state), the (self)monitoring of the hunters (behavior, weapons, respect of the quotas, 
distribution and accomplishment of the common tasks), the territorial protection of wildlife. 
Enlarged associations exist which are responsible for the management and hunting of the 
most mobile species. Finally, the hunting association has to bear half the costs of the damage 
caused by fauna to agriculture. This delegation of responsibility has some advantages for the 
members of the association: they have the fundamental right to accept or exclude non-
members from access to the resource, the hunting periods are significantly longer than the 
ones of the licence system, members of the association can (in accordance with club 
customs) invite friends or acquaintances to hunt in the affermage, state control of the 
members’ behavior is more loose, there is considerable freedom to organize hunting 
activities within the affermage (for example the possibility of constituting teams or groups, 
or of defining the way in which the quotas are reallocated), finally, historically, the 
affermage has long perpetuated the old tradition of “ autumn hunting ”. 
A (theoretical) consequence of these shared responsibilities is that members of such 
associations have strong incentives to collaborate in the good management of the affermage, 
as well as of the resource (wildlife).  
However, if the system of affermages is, as we can see, characterized by a strong component 
of self-organization and -monitoring, a large part of the resource management is still the 
prerogative of the state. In fact, the state administration defines the goals of the planing as 
well as the quotas allocated to the different affermages through consultation  within a 
hunting commission, composed of representatives of the various actors concerned18, who 
together devise a hunting plan.  
Finally, this co-managed system shares also some of the characteristics of a nested enterprise 
(Ostrom 1990:90), except the fact that state remains the central actor of the governance 
structure. Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and 
governance activities occur within this system at different levels of organization. Moreover, 
the local affermages are regrouped in a peak association organized at the state level. It is 
responsible for the supply of game as well as for hunting statistics. Both sets of data are 
elaborated by compiling information furnished by the different affermages as well as from 
the official game-keepers (when they exist)19. It also defends the interests of the local 
associations against the state authorities or other interest groups of rival users (agriculturists, 
tourists, members of nature protection's organizations, walkers, riders, etc.). 
 
C. THE STATE MONOPOLY SYSTEM 
This system, implemented in one state only (the canton of Geneva), can be considered as an 
non-conceded state monopoly regime. In fact, since the acceptation, in May 1974, of a 
popular initiative emanating from animal protection organizations, hunting is completely 
forbidden over the whole state territory. The state environmental administration has been 
entitled with the task of monitoring and regulating wildlife and its vital environment. In 
                                                 
18 The commission encompasses representatives of the hunters, foresters, of the agriculture, of the communes 
and finally of the nature protection associations. 
19 In 1996, the 16 cantons operating a licence system employed together 163 official game-keepers (and 528 
auxiliaries) for 19'574 hunters (=1 game-keeper for 120 hunters). At the same time, the 9 cantons 
operating a renting system employed only 9 official game-keepers (but a large number of auxiliaries) for 
11'939 hunters (=1 game-keeper for 1326 hunters). 6 of these 9 cantons do not dispose of any official 
game-keeper 
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order to accomplish this task, the administration employs 13 full time official game-
keepers20. 
The decision-making process is the responsibility of two distinct commissions, instead of 
one (in all the other states): beside the usual consultative commission21, a constitutional 
commission22 has been instituted which is entitled to deliver exceptional authorizations to 
shoot animals, depending on the damage caused by the fauna to the forest or agriculture. 
These shoots are usually carried out during the night by the game-keepers. 
Although it is true that such a system seems to have the advantage of being exclusively 
oriented towards the management of biodiversity, and is de facto dissociated from the 
problems caused by the monitoring of hunters, this method of managing wildlife 
nevertheless has a certain number of severe inconveniences: 
1° This "Leviathanist" solution is very expensive: financing of the costly administrative 
means used for its implementation is not counterbalanced by the income derived from the 
hunting régale. 
2° There is no possibility of partly delegating the job of regulation to the hunters. This seems 
to be a unreasonable solution to the extent that hunters not only constitute a source of 
conflict, but, when competent, can also provide a very interesting solution for the 
management of wildlife: contrary to the official game-keepers, hunters are not paid but 
agree to pay a certain amount to have the right of access to the resource, and thereby 
contribute to the task of management. 
3° The hunting ethic is not respected by the official game-keepers when shooting animals 
during the night with illegal weapons23. 
4° Last but not least, wildlife regulation is severely complicated by the fact that, during 
hunting periods in neighboring regions (in France and other Swiss cantons), game animals, 
obviously doted with learning capacities, tend to migrate on considerable numbers to the 
canton of Geneva, transforming it into a vast protected area or natural reserve. Such wildlife 
movements cause great damage to agriculture and significantly alter the biodiversity 
equilibrium. 
 
D. COMMENTS 
There is no obvious link between local conditions affecting the resource and the choice of 
the hunting system. A study of the spatial distribution of the different systems within the 
country (cf. figure 1) shows that neither the topographical conditions, nor the spatial 
distribution of the species has any immediate influence on the choice of the hunting 
system24. 
                                                 
20 This is a large number compared to the cantons with a renting system. Moreover, the canton of Geneva is 
territorially a very small one. 
21 This commission is, however, characterized by the weak representation of hunters: 1/12. 
22 Reflecting the structure of the regional political power situation, this constitutional commission is composed 
exclusively by representatives of the animal protection and environmental organizations. 
23 Federal law strictly forbids night shooting as well as the use of infra-rouge weapons. 
24 It is however worth noting (1) that the implementation of Geneva's state monopoly system in a territorially 
more extended state is most improbable and (2) that all the big alpine states have chosen to retain the 
licence system. 
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Figure 1: The geographical distribution of the different hunting systems in Switzerland. 
 
It is more probable that the original choice of one or the other system in the different parts of 
the country has something to do with the sociological structure of the hunting community 
and probably also with the sociohistorical structure of the regional society. One of the most 
plausible explanation worth mentioning here is the probable greater permanence in the North 
East part of the country of some structural aspects of the Old Regime society such as, for 
example, the structure of land and forest property25. Thus, the proximity of the Swiss renting 
states with the German Land of Bavaria, the Austrian region of Vorarlberg and the French 
Department of Alsace, all organized according to the renting principle, constitutes a strong 
argument in favor of this hypothesis. 
During the first part of the XXth century, the decision to return to the renting system26 was 
justified by the objective of limiting overexploitation of the resource, as the renting system is 
specifically able to limit the number of hunters (Blanckenhorn 1990). During the 1920’ and 
the 1930’, there was a lively debate between the advocates of the two systems. Renting 
advocates claimed that they encouraged “good” management of the resource, pointing out 
that the subsequent resource depletion was the direct result of the licence system, while 
advocates of licensing argued on the democratic right to have free access to the resource and 
to the practice of hunting, and accused the renting system of being “aristocratic” in this 
regard. This philosophical/political opposition was perpetuated in the institutions by the 
creation of two distinct hunters’ federations at national level. 
It is worth noting that, as a logical result of the principle of  allocation of the income 
generated by the state régale, state Governments have usually been in favor of the licence 
system, while the communes have traditionally been in favor of the renting one. 
                                                 
25 The presence of renting hunting systems could probably be an indirect indicator of the regional differences 
in the social penetration and effects of the French Revolution. 
26 At the end of the XIXth century, the renting system had almost disappeared. Its reappearance dates from the 
beginning of the XXth century. 
Types of hunting systems
Renting System   (9)
Licence System   (16)
Hunting Forbidden  (1)
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2° Salient features of the three hunting systems 
 
These three systems contrast above all in the way the state “regalian” rights (i.e. 
appropriation, control, and collection of fiscal income) are conceded to the appropriators. A 
description of the 4 ideal-types of property regimes provides a useful heuristic instrument 
which can aid in clarifying the situation concerning the main features and principles 
characterizing these various systems. 
 
Figure 2: Four types of property regimes  
 Private 
Property 
State property Common Property No Property 
Open 
Access 
Hunting 
system 
Renting 
(France, 
Austria, 
Germany, etc.) 
State monopoly not conceded 
(Switzerland) 
Licence  (Switzerland) 
Renting (Switzerland) 
Even if this is not "legally" a 
common property regime27, 
one can consider that the 
concession of the appropriation 
right for several years to the 
association approximates to a 
"common property regime". 
? 
Exclusive 
title in the 
hands of 
(/conceded 
to) 
Individuals 
Corporations 
Local-authority level 
Province/State level 
Federal level 
Groups 
Corporations 
 
Everybody and 
nobody 
Exclusion 
of non-
owners 
Yes Foreigners?) Yes No 
Control of 
access  
Individuals and 
corporations 
backed by State 
State Groups 
State 
No 
Decision-
making 
process in 
the regime 
Individuals and 
corporations 
Administration 
State Agency 
Corporations 
(co-management concerning the 
definition and the allocation of 
quotas) 
No 
Other 
examples 
Farming land National Parks 
State forest 
Underground water 
Grazing land 
(clean) air 
Climate 
Source: Knoepfel, Kissling-Naef, Varone, 1998, compiled on the basis of Ostrom, 1990, 
Bromley, 1991, Devlin and Grafton, 1998. 
 
This figure allows to show what are the main divergent characteristics of the three systems 
and how they fit with the main components of one or the other property regime. As we can 
see, the main differences between the licence and the renting systems concern the possession 
(or concession) of the property titles, the capacity to exclude non-owners, the control of 
                                                 
27 In a strictly legal sense, "common property" does not exist in Switzerland (Leimbacher, Perler 2000): 
private and public law only recognize two kinds of property regimes: private and state properties. Thus, 
according to the Swiss civil code, the alpine commons (Netting 1981; Ostrom 1990:61-65) do not 
constitute a "common property", but are either a communal (state) or private (group) property. 
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access as well as, finally, the decision making process within the regime. The renting system 
resembles the ideal-type of common property regime, while the licence one constitutes 
typically a state property regime. 
 
Without wishing to cut short this historical debate between two opposing points of view, it is 
still possible, in my opinion, to spot some of the strengths and weaknesses of the three 
systems, regarding management of the resource: 
 
1° The State monopoly system is difficult and costly to implement, as the state administration 
is constrained to assess the needs and carry out the management activities on its own, i.e. 
without being able to count on the field knowledge of the hunters. The system is not easily 
able to adapt to the transformations of the resource system. Moreover, it is hardly compatible 
with the systems of the neighboring regions, as the countryside around Geneva is 
transformed into a kind of big natural reserve or "district franc". 
 
2° The main strength of the renting system consists in its capacity to take advantage of the 
hunters' skills as well as their knowledge of the local situation. It has also the reputation of 
significantly improving their ecological sensitivity through their collective involvement in 
the management of the resource28. It is all the more effective because the affermages are 
attributed during a sufficiently long time period to render the effects of the management 
concretely observable. 
Another argument in favor of this system deals with its capacity to control the localization of 
the impacts by using the quota system: Contrary to the licence system, quotas of animals are 
attributed to accurately defined locations (i.e. within an affermage) and cannot be used in 
another part of the state territory. 
The elements presented above suggest that this system has also some important weaknesses. 
In addition to criticisms regarding its undemocratic features, it seems that there is some 
difficulty in producing trustworthy data and statistics, both for the planning of quotas as well 
as for their accurate implementation. The very small number of game-keepers seems to play 
a significant role in this respect29. Finally, the capacity of the system to monitor and manage 
the most mobile species is significantly weaker than in the more centralized licence system. 
 
3° On the other hand, the main strength of the licence system resides precisely in its attempt 
to develop accurate management and planning of the resource uses. So, the historical 
improvement of the management capacities of the licence system are not only due to the 
better endowment in professional game-keepers, but are also the result of more centralized 
management at a probably more appropriate level. The regional (state) level seems in fact to 
be more pertinent in the case of a mobile resource like wildlife (cf. the "interstate 
management program”). Moreover, the joint use of quotas and of the hunting reserves (or 
districts francs) makes it possible to safeguard the reproductive capacity of the resource 
stock by disentangling the problems resulting from the management of the "capital" 
(resource stock or system) from those relating to uses of the "interests" (resource units). 
The main weaknesses of the licence system have already been mentioned. Historically there 
was a clear tendency of the system to lead towards overexploitation, especially due to the 
fact that the number of hunters cannot be limited, contrary to the renting system. 
                                                 
28 It is of course difficult to accurately "measure" such a phenomenon however it is often mentioned in 
interviews. A possible indicator could be the publicizing of environmental questions in the official 
journals of the two hunting associations (renting and licence associations). 
29 The problem is thus to know, for example, who monitor the territories located outside the affermages. 
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In the light of these important organizational differences, an interesting question consists in 
the analysis of their respective impacts and outcomes30 regarding the evolution of some 
representative species’ live-stock. This is briefly treated in the next part. 
 
 
3° A statistical analysis of the impacts and outcomes of the different hunting systems31 
 
The results presented below do not constitute an exhaustive study of the respective 
potentialities of the different systems for the sustainable management of the resource. 
Hereby, I only want to (1) present the contrasted impacts and outcomes of the different 
systems and (2) suggest some hypotheses to explain them. In the last part of the paper, I will 
however go further in the interpretation of these differences. 
A (very simple) statistical analysis of the available national hunting and wildlife data over a 
period of 30 years (1968-1998) reveals some interesting tendencies related to hunting 
management under the different systems, as well as their effects on the fauna. 
The most obvious trend is the general increase of the different fauna live-stock during this 
time period (cf. the right hand column “National Average” of Figure 3). This increase goes 
from 42% for roes to 75% for chamois. The case of the ibex is somewhat peculiar in that it 
was reintroduced in the protected areas (districts francs) of some alpine regions at the 
beginning of the XXth century, that is, exclusively in licence system states. Its presence in a 
first renting based canton (St Gall) is rather recent. This explains the astonishing increase 
rate there of near 500%. 
                                                 
30 Referring to Knoepfel, Larrue, Varone (forthcoming) I propose to distinguish between outputs 
(administrative decisions), impacts (effective behavior of the target group, here the hunters) and outcomes 
(effects on the resource system). In the following part, statistics can be considered as referring above all to 
impacts (number of animals shot is a result of hunters behavior), as well as, to a certain extent, to 
outcomes (the evolution of game live-stock). 
31 This statistical section does not take into account the state monopoly system, as the available data are not 
pertinent: There are no ibex or chamois and only very few roe on its territory. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of game live-stock in the renting and licence systems over 30 years 
(1968-1998) 
Increase of the different live-stock as a % 
per system 
Renting Licence National 
Average 
Red-deer 
 
+ 21% + 74% + 70% 
Roe 
 
+ 1% + 98% + 42,2% 
Chamois 
(Only 10% of the chamois are located in the 
renting states) 
+ 70% + 75% + 74,7% 
Ibex 
(Only 7% of the ibex are located in the 
renting states) 
+ 489% + 222% + 232% 
Source : Ministry of Environment (OFEFP/BUWAL), hunting section; my own calculation 
 
The results of figure 3 show something very interesting and, from a historical point of view, 
to a certain extent paradoxical. The increase rate (above all for roe and red-deer live-stock), 
far from being homogeneous, is in fact very contrasted between the two systems. Thus, 
contrary to the situation during the first part of the XXth century, the licence system, during 
the last 30 years, has been (much) more favorable to the reproduction and the growth of the 
resource stock than the renting one. 
Factors corroborating and emphasizing this first general observation can be deduced from 
figure A1 (annex 1) comparing the level of the hunting pressure exercised within the two 
different systems. As one can observe in figures 4a and b, this pressure is on average 
stronger in the renting system. The proportion of game animals shot is in any cases 
systematically higher in the renting system than in the licence one. This explains of course 
the differences observed in the increase of the resource stock. 
 
Figure 4a, b: Comparison of hunting pressure between renting and licence systems 1968-
1998 (roe and red-deer). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A second interesting observation which can be derived from these statistical data concerns 
the respective "management philosophies" within the two systems. A comparison (figures 5a 
and b and 5c and d) of the relation between the curves (expressed in total numbers) of (1) 
live-stock and (2) game animals shot for different species, tends, in the renting system, to 
show a closer relation between variations of the total live-stock and variations of the bag, 
than in the licence one. 
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Figure 5a and b: Relation between total live-stock and the bag in the renting system (red-
deer and roe) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 5c and d: Relation between total live-stock and the bag in the licence system (red-
deer and roe)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In fact, in the renting system (figures 5a and b), the curve of the bag tends to follow 
variations in live-stock numbers more directly, whereas in the licence one (figures 5c and d), 
the number of animals shot tends to be more stable and independent from the annual 
variation in live-stock numbers. Such a difference seems to indicate that management in the 
renting system is more sensitive to changes occurring on the (micro)local level and tends to 
adapt to them more accurately and rapidly. This is still true, even if this adaptation is the 
result of the sum of different local, independent and loosely coordinated processes. It thus 
seems that adaptation processes are easier to implement in a renting system than in a licence 
one, probably due to the fact that the decision-making process is more directly linked to the 
empirical local situation, and is thus easier to understand for the hunters. In fact, while, in the 
licence system, a modification of the annual hunting plan simultaneously affects all the 
hunters of a canton in the same way, modifications in the renting one have very segmented, 
territorially differentiated impacts. Thus, significant modifications are much more easily 
implemented in the latter system due to the fact that (1) hunters are more familiar with such 
changes, (2) the changes are not the same for all the appropriators at the same time, and are 
less susceptible to lead to collective opposition, and (3) as the consequences of the changes 
for the hunters are more fragmented, and more directly linked to local conditions, they tend 
to be more easily understood and accepted. 
 
Although statistically quite clear, the interpretation of these results in terms of “success” or 
“failure” is however all but evident. If it is true that one of the main objectives of Swiss 
hunting policy during the last century was to significantly increase live-stock in order to 
recover from the dramatic situation inherited from the end of the XIXth century, the more 
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recent objectives of this policy32, focused above all on the protection of biodiversity, that is, 
the creation of conditions favoring a judicious spatial distribution of wildlife, avoiding local 
situations of superabundance. This shift in the main objectives of the policy contributes to 
rendering the interpretation of the results presented above much more complex and 
ambiguous. 
Thus, depending on the situation faced by the different states, which may vary at the 
different historical periods from overuse to underutilization, the performances of the two 
systems will of course be theoretically evaluated in a completely different way: 
 
Figure 6: Contrasting evaluations of the two regimes according to the resource state at the 
end of the XXth century. 
Possible situation at the end of 
XXth century 
Renting Licence 
Overuse situation Weaker performance because of 
its difficulty to increase live stock 
Better performance because of its 
capacity to increase live-stock 
Underutilization situation Better performance because of its 
capacity to limit the increase of 
live-stock 
Weaker performance because of 
its difficulty to limit the increase of 
live-stock 
 
As there is no clear indication that renting states are facing underutilization situations or 
licence ones face overuse, any further empirical evaluation of the system performance would 
imply conducting systematic research on resource conditions in each of the states. 
But the difficulty of such a work would still be aggravated by the fact that the different 
actors involved in wildlife management tend to express very contrasted opinions concerning 
the resource management aims. This is typically the case for state officials, responsible for 
fauna management in the different state environmental departments33. Depending on their 
"policy core belief" (Sabatier 1993, 1999) –the focus on ecocentric priorities (absolute 
preservation of biodiversity) versus the focus on a more anthropocentric priority (supply of 
an abundant game stock for the hunters)- the officials' oral interpretation of the performance 
of the two systems has proved to be very different. In some states, for example Wallis or 
Vaud, the increase of the fauna is still considered as the central goal, whilst in others, for 
example St Gall, it is viewed as problematic regarding the requirements of biodiversity 
protection. From the hunters' point of view, "success" is of course defined by the increase of 
the resource stock. Finally, foresters and agriculturists for their part, support the ecocentric 
point of view. Thus, the increase of the heterogeneity of the user groups, as well as the 
existence of some uncertainties and discussions concerning the “right way" to manage the 
resource in a sustainable way, seems to render the definition of "success" or "failure" criteria 
much more controversial. 
Finally, independently from an eventual “final” objective interpretation of these results, one 
certitude does however exist which is that during the last 30 years, contrary to the first part 
of the XXth century, the renting system has become more game consuming (or able to limit 
the increase of the resource live-stock, if we want to express it in a positive manner) than the 
licence one and has contributed to a lesser degree to the general increase of the national 
live-stock. 
These results tend also to show a significant difference between the “hunting philosophies” 
of the two systems. My hypothesis is that the centralized and state controlled licence system 
tends, at a regional level, to develop a more long term oriented management, independent 
                                                 
32 As they are explained in article 1 of the new Federal Law of 1986. 
33 I interviewed representatives of 7 states (4 licence states, 2 renting states and Geneva). 
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from annual variations of the resource numbers; whereas, management in the renting system 
is the result of the sum of a large number of partial adjustments at the local level. 
Once again, the interpretation in terms of sustained use of the resource is mostly ambiguous 
and depends on the final objective. Thus, both systems seem to have strengths and 
weaknesses regarding these two objectives. 
 
Figure 7: Strengths and weaknesses of the renting and licence systems regarding the 
possible objectives of the wildlife management. 
Hunting systems/objectives Renting Licence 
Increase of live-stock Strength: the capacity to limit the 
number of hunters. 
Weakness: Contrary to the 
beginning of the XXth century, the 
system appear to have been more 
game consuming during the last 30 
years. 
Strength: Contrary to the end of 
the XIXth century, the system 
appears to have been able to 
significantly increase the resource 
stock during the last 30 years 
through strict quotas and protected 
areas. 
Weakness: Difficulty in limiting 
the number of hunters. 
Management of the spatial 
distribution (biodiversity 
preservation) 
Strength: Capacity to accurately 
control the spatial localization of 
the impacts (quotas). 
Weakness: The final effects 
(outcomes) of this capacity are 
strongly modified by the 
uncertainty resulting from the high 
mobility of certain species. 
Strength: Development of 
centralized monitoring and 
planning facilities consistent with 
the mobility of the resource. 
Weakness: weaker ability to 
control the spatial localization of 
the impacts (quotas). 
 
 
4° Investigating the obstacles towards collective action in wildlife management 
 
Even if noticeable differences exist concerning the degree of state intervention between the 
various systems, wildlife management in Switzerland strongly depends on state as well as 
Federal intervention. Contrary to the normative prescriptions sometimes derived from the 
CPR theory (for example Becker & Ostrom 1995; McKean & Ostrom 1995; Ostrom 1998), 
collective action towards self-organization has still not proven to be the most efficient way to 
overcome overexploitation in that case. 
My thesis is that this omnipresence of state intervention is not the result of a possible 
collective "state oriented bias" of Swiss society, but above all the result of structural 
constraints related to resource management and uses, as well as the physical and biological 
characteristics of the resource. 
A pertinent way of pointing out these structural constraints and characteristics of the 
resource which make self-governance very unlikely consists in systematically evaluating the 
8 design principles for "long-enduring self-organized and self-governed CPRs" elaborated by 
Elinor Ostrom (1990:90, 2000), for the 3 different hunting systems as they developed 
historically in the Swiss context. 
In fact, there are, in my opinion, 2 different ways of considering the possible uses of these 8 
institutional design principles: (1) as a heuristic instrument, or (2) as a prescriptive tool for 
policy design. In agreement with Stein and Edward's remark (1999:552) on this topic, I am 
convinced (Nahrath 2000) that, after analyzing western contemporary industrialized 
societies, the most effective use of these design principles consists in considering them as an 
analytical tool resembling a weberian "ideal-type". Thus, their systematic comparison with 
the characteristics of the empirical hunting systems should enable differences with the ideal-
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typical principles to be measured/quantified/assessed, pointing out the relevant 
characteristics of the resource that render collective action unlikely, and, by contrast, state 
intervention probably necessary. 
Finally, identifying these obstacles will also contribute to partly explaining the contrasted 
impacts and outcomes presented in the statistical analysis. 
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Figure 8: The degree of conformity of the 3 hunting systems with the 8 design principles for 
long enduring self organized CPR regimes. 
Hunting systems/ 
Design principles 
Non conceded state 
monopoly (Geneva) 
Renting Licence 
1) Clearly defines 
boundaries of both, (1) 
the appropriators and 
(2) the resource 
(1) NO , there are no direct 
appropriators (hunters), but a 
situation in which multiple 
indirect users (tourism, walkers, 
animal friends) coexist 
(sometimes concurrently) with 
(mostly  negatively) affected 
groups (agriculturists, foresters)  
(2) NO , delimitation of the 
boundaries is affected by the 
mobility of the resource 
(1) YES , only members of the 
hunting association are entitled to 
hunt in the affermage 
But, indirect (multiple) users 
(tourism, walkers, animals 
friends) are however impossible 
to exclude 
(2) NO , delimitation of the 
boundaries is affected by the 
mobility of the resource 
(1) NO , there is no possibility of 
limiting the number of 
appropriators and indirect 
(multiple) users (tourism, walkers, 
animals friends) are however 
impossible to exclude 
(2) NO , delimitation of the 
boundaries is affected by the 
mobility of the resource 
2) Congruence of the 
rules with the local 
conditions 
NO , but such a system would be 
unconceivable in a larger state 
NO , there is no clear link between 
the choice of the hunting system 
and the local conditions of the 
resource 
But, there is a link between the 
size of the affermage and the 
number of hunters entitled to hunt 
on the territory 
NO , there is no clear link between 
the choice of the hunting system 
and the local conditions of the 
resource 
3) Collective -choice 
arrangement allowing 
individuals affected by 
the operational rules 
to participate in their 
modification 
NO , even if hunters could try to 
change the law through direct 
democracy 
YES , but this possibility is 
restricted to a limited number of 
operational rules within the 
affermage 
NO , but hunters associations have 
a consultative power that can 
possibly affect to a limited degree 
the content of the state decisions 
4) Monitoring of (1) 
the resource and (2) 
the appropriators is 
carried out by the 
appropriators 
themselves or by 
monitors accountable 
to them 
(1) NO  
(2) NO  
(1) YES , but the planning is not 
the responsibility of appropriators 
(2) YES  
(1) NO , game-keepers do it  
(2) NO , game-keepers do it  
5) Graduated 
sanctions 
NO YES , there is a self-monitoring 
process within the affermage, but, 
state officials can also directly 
sanction deviant behavior 
NO , sanctions are imposed 
directly by state officials  
6) Rapid local conflict-
resolution mechanisms 
at low-cost 
NO YES , some mechanisms of this 
kind exist within the affermage, 
but they can be thwarted by 
official state intervention 
NO 
7) Minimal recognition 
by external (state) 
authorities of rights to 
organize 
NO YES , hunting associations have 
some autonomy in their internal 
organization, but this autonomy is 
limited.  
NO , no real structured long 
enduring self-organized body 
interferes with the hunting 
practice 
But, formation of informal local 
groups does however exist which 
should not exceed 4 persons.  
8) Nested enterprises NO YES , appropriation, provision, 
monitoring of the resource, as 
well as conflict resolution and 
governance activities are co-
managed by the local hunting 
associations and the state hunting 
administration. 
Enlarged associations also exist 
for more mobile species 
NO, except interstate monitoring 
programs.  
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Figure 8 help us identify the main obstacles that render collective action towards self-
government solutions for CPR situation in the case of wildlife management in Switzerland 
very unlikely. Even in the case of the renting system –the closest to the ideal-type of 
common property regime-, it seems that there are severe difficulties in attaining 5 of the 8 
design principles. 
Principle 1: empirical evidence shows that a clear definition of the appropriators has 
historically become more and more difficult and unlikely since wildlife/fauna has been 
subject to increasingly heterogeneous direct or indirect uses34. Today, wildlife management 
does not consist only in organizing hunting practice and monitoring fauna and hunters, but 
involves the integration and the coordination of a set of heterogeneous practices as well as 
recognizing that user groups have various impacts on the resource and its living space35. In 
this respect, it is mostly unlikely that boundaries of the (local) group of appropriators 
coincide with the ones of the resource system. On the contrary, the heterogeneization of the 
user groups usually implies an extension of their recruitment area, which makes it politically 
very difficult to exclude external appropriators from access to the resource. 
The users' heterogeneity also leads to the development of contradictory ideas concerning the 
legitimate use of the resource (cf. for example conception of wildlife of Geneva's citizen 
while accepting the popular initiative forbidding hunting). 
A second obstacle brought to light by this first principle concerns the mobility of the 
resource. If this characteristic does not per se abolish any possibility of CPR auto-regulation 
(cf. the abundant examples of auto-regulated fisheries), it nevertheless significantly 
contributes to rendering it more difficult to develop36. 
Principle 2: As we have already seen, there is no evident link between the choice of the 
hunting system and the characteristics/peculiarities of the various local situations. 
Principle 3: the possibility for appropriators affected by the operational rules to participate to 
their elaboration and modification is significantly limited, even in the renting system. Thus, 
local associations do not participate in the decision-making process within the resource use 
policy. 
Principle 4: (idem principle 3) The responsibility for monitoring the resource does not 
include participation in the planing process, which remains the exclusive task of the state 
administration. The mobility of the resource units, the increase in heterogeneous direct and 
indirect uses as well as the presence of partly non-local rival groups of users; and finally the 
necessity to develop more coordinated planning models, including living space management, 
has contributed significantly to an increase in the transaction costs, making them hardly 
bearable for a self-organized association based on voluntary reciprocal trust and 
commitment. 
Finally, local affermage associations do not have the monopoly of the monitoring of the 
appropriators’ behavior: The state administration can intervene directly on the members of 
the affermage in order to sanction deviant behavior. 
                                                 
34 One should in fact also consider the immaterial uses of wildlife like, for example, observation, photography, 
etc. If these uses do not directly contribute to resource depletion, they nevertheless have an impact on it as 
well as on the way the resource is managed (cf. tourist uses of the resource). 
35 Unlike the discussion about "heterogeneity" in the CPR literature (for example Becker, Ostrom 1995; 
Schlager and Blomquist 1998), the problem to be dealt with does not consist here only in the heterogeneity 
within the users group, but between various and rival groups of users. 
36 There is however in my opinion an important difference between fishes and wildlife management in that the 
living space of the latter is much more complex, diversified and submitted to contradictory depletive 
human uses than that of the former. 
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Principle 7: (idem principles 3 and 4) The minimal recognition by external governmental 
authorities of the rights to organize is limited to specific and non-planning aspects of the 
management process. 
 
This first analysis concerning the obstacles faced by collective action in heterogeneous 
(western) societies can be completed by focusing on the more specific peculiarities of both 
the attributes of the resource and the attributes of the appropriators (or of the appropriation's 
process) that are considered as fundamental conditions favoring the development of self-
governing associations (figure 9, below). 
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Figure 9: Conditions favoring the formation of self-governing associations compared with peculiarities of wildlife resource and hunting 
(adapted from Ostrom 2000:34-35) 
ATTRIBUTES OF THE RESOURCE  IN THE CASE OF WILDLIFE… 
R1 Feasible improvement: Resource conditions are not at such a point of 
deterioration that it is useless to organize, nor are they so underutilized that 
little advantage results from organizing. 
This condition has often not been fulfilled during the XXth century. At the end of the XIXth century, the process of 
resource depletion was so advanced that only a strong centralized state intervention enabled the tendency to be 
reversed. This is the exact opposite of the situation that prevails nowadays. The progressive emergence of cases of 
underutilization of the resource does not facilitate the development of self-organizing associations. 
R2 Indicators: Reliable and valid indicators of the condition of the 
resource system are frequently available at a relatively low cost. 
Reliable and valid indicators exist, but they are not available even at a relatively low cost. Thus, relatively high 
transaction costs considerably reduce the likeliness of self-organization, by lessening the probability of a 
substantial benefit resulting from cooperation. 
R3 Predictability: The flow of resource units is relatively predictable. The predictability of the flow of resource units depends on the existence of monitoring and planning capacities 
organized at a larger level than the one of the local groups of resource appropriators. 
R4 Spatial extent: The resource system is sufficiently small, given the 
transportation and communication technology in use, that appropriators 
can acquire accurate knowledge of external boundaries and internal 
microenvironments. 
This could theoretically be the case, but the mobility and the fluctuating boundaries of the resource render the 
production of such knowledge rather costly and not so accurate. 
ATTRIBUTES OF THE APPROPRIATORS (APPROPRIATION’S 
SITUATION) 
IN THE CASE OF HUNTING… 
A1 Salience: Appropriators are dependent on the resource system for a 
major portion of their livelihood. 
This is clearly not he case. However, in order to be able to understand the logic of hunters' behavior one should not 
underestimate the cultural significance of the hunting practice. To a certain extent, even if hunters do not depend 
on the resource for their livelihood, they are dependent on it for the satisfaction of deeply rooted cultural 
preferences and “needs”. 
A2 Common understanding: Appropriators have a shared image of how 
the resource system operates (attributes R1, 2, 3 and 4 above) and how 
their actions affect each other and the resource system. 
This is hardly the case. If the renting system is clearly more favorable to the development of such a shared image, 
the mobility of the resource, its considerable spatial extension as well as its fluctuating boundaries contribute to 
blur this image. More particularly, mobility affects appropriators' perception of how their actions affect each other 
and the resource system. 
A3 Low discount rate: Appropriators use a sufficiently low discount rate in 
relation to future benefits to be achieved from the resource. 
Such a calculation is really difficult to envisage in the case of wildlife, because of the fact that mobility and 
external factors affecting reproduction rate strongly interfere in the whole process. 
A4 Trust and reciprocity: Appropriators trust one another to keep promises 
and reciprocally relate to one another. 
The probability of the development of relations of trust and reciprocity between the hunters is significantly 
increased in the case of the renting system in which they strongly depend one another for the good management of 
the affermage. 
A5 Autonomy: Appropriators are able to determine access and harvesting 
rules without external authorities countermanding them. 
This is partly the case in the renting system, but this autonomy is limited by the fact that hunting associations 
themselves are not entitled to define the quantity of resource units to be appropriated. 
A6 Prior organizational experience and local leadership: Appropriators 
have learned at least minimal skills of organization and leadership through 
participation in other local associations, or in learning about ways that 
neighboring groups have organized. 
This is or could easily be the case. 
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Finally, all the remarks and observations made above can be regrouped in three kinds of 
obstacle making collective action towards self-organizing wildlife management unlikely. 
 
1° The physical characteristics of the resource 
Two physical characteristics of the resource constitute severe obstacles to the development 
of self-organized solution of wildlife management: 
- The mobility of resource units affects the coincidence between the boundaries of the 
resource and those of its appropriator group. This absence of coincidence strongly affects 
local appropriators’ capacity to efficiently monitor the resource, as well as to monitor each 
others behavior. This view is further expanded by Schlager, Blomquist and Tang (1994). 
They suggest that mobility of the resource units aggravates the CPR problem in four main 
ways (1994:298): 
1° users are more likely to attribute decreases in supply to the behavior of users elsewhere in 
the system (for an example of this kind see Dalla Bernardina 1988); 
2° the users in any one location cannot control the resource flow/movement even if they act 
collectively; 
3° because no one group can control the flow/movement and capture/enjoy the benefits of 
collective action, users in any one location are less likely to provide benefits for users 
elsewhere in the system by restraining their own appropriation activities; 
4° coordinating activities with users in other locations raises transaction costs. 
Thus, monitoring a mobile resource calls for an organization at a higher territorial level than 
the local one, as well as the development of different and supplementary (most of the time 
costly) instruments (cf. the example of interstate planning programs). 
- The biological nature of the resource constitute an interesting element challenging natural 
resource management. Probably more than other natural resources usually taken in account 
in the CPR theory (water, grazing, forest), wildlife highlights the problems resulting from the 
interdependence of natural resource ecosystems. In the case studied here, serious wildlife 
management cannot exist without a parallel management of its living space. This intertwined 
management therefore involves an increase in the number of (direct and indirect) user 
(and/or interested) groups, which, of course, complicates cooperation by increasing 
transaction costs. 
 
2° The increasing importance of interpolicy coordination within the resource regime 
as a result of the increasing heterogeneity of the resource uses/users 
It is not only the biological nature of the resource that increases the number of users and 
interested groups to be included in the resource management regime, but also the 
development of increasingly contradictory uses of nature by humans. Wildlife management, 
through hunting policy, has progressively faced the central problem linked to the fact that a 
number of important activities affecting the reproduction process of the resource, such as 
tourism, leisure, sports, or transport infrastructures, were not included (and/or are probably 
very difficult to include) in local management arrangements. Since 1986, there has been a 
shift in policy objectives towards the protection of biodiversity and this has further 
reinforced the need for interpolicy coordination. 
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3° The role of ideas, knowledge and a more scientific approach to wildlife 
management 
Without doubt, the importance of ideational and symbolic dimensions in human affairs has 
without doubt been somewhat neglected by the CPR scholars. In my opinion this dimension 
mainly interferes within the process of natural resource management in two ways. 
- The first concerns the way knowledge about resource systems is produced. Focusing 
exclusively on single use situations, CPR theory tends to underestimate the challenge of 
producing knowledge about the conditions, requirements, problems, or fragility of self-
reproducing resource systems. In my opinion, the view that local empirical knowledge has 
become less and less able to interpret more and more interdependent processes of resource 
management is not necessarily that of a narrow minded scientist. Thus, as a consequence of 
the increasing interdependency of more and more varied uses of the different resource 
systems, the sustainable management of the system as well as the judicious allocation of 
resource units is no longer possible without an accurate knowledge of the effects of these 
hunting activities (as well as all kinds of other human activities), not only on the state of the 
resource, but also on all the other systems that are interdependent within the encompassing 
living space (forests, flora, soils, etc.) (Mangel and alia 1997:54-57). This of course involves 
important costs resulting from the collecting of information and the production of scientific 
knowledge about the biological process. It is absolutely not clear how collective action could 
overcome the problems engendered by such costs. 
 
- The second way consists in assessing the role played by ideational or symbolic components 
in the evaluation and perception of a given situation of the resource by different user groups 
involved in the management process (Fabiani 1982, 1984). Here we once again find 
constructivist criticism (Stein and Edwards 1999). As clearly appeared in the case presented 
here, the definition of "success" or "failure" regarding fauna management does not depend 
only on objective and clearly defined criteria, but on a social and political stake. The 
difficulty in formulating an evaluation of the outcomes of the different hunting systems 
perfectly illustrated the problem. 
In our case, characterized by (1) the absence of appropriators’ vital dependence on the 
resource and (2) the progressive development of situations of underutilization, the evaluation 
of "success" or "failure" of an institutional arrangement for the management of the resource 
no longer depends on basic and easily accessible indicators of its condition, but on the 
contrary, on a complexity of social and political factors which together contribute to a 
definition of the legitimate kind of nature desired. Thus, in Swiss society, today the central 
question does not consist in finding the best arrangement to avoid the tragedy of the 
(wildlife) commons, but in finding a collective agreement on the type of nature, and more 
particularly of wildlife, we want to have. In this respect, strong opposition –not only on the 
part of hunters- to the presence of all kinds of ancient or new predators (lynx, wolves or 
bears) provides a significant indication of a possible answer to this question. 
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5° Conclusion 
 
A (historical) comparison of the three hunting systems in Switzerland through the lens of the 
CPRs theory allows the formulation of 4 important statements: 
 
1° In my opinion, it has been demonstrated that, according to the present day circumstances, 
the CPR self-governance solution is very unlikely to emerge in the Swiss context, and that, 
consequently, state intervention is necessary to overcome the challenges of wildlife 
management. 
 
2° Comparing and contrasting the different hunting systems with the ideal-typical 
characteristics of a self-organized CPR regime has allowed severe obstacles to be pointed 
out to the development of collective action towards self-organizing wildlife management. 
These factors include: the absence of vital appropriators’ dependence on the resource; the 
progressive development of local situations of underutilization; the heterogeneity of users (or 
interested actors) leading to multilevel conflicts; the mobility of the resource units; and 
finally interdependence of ecosystems. 
 
3° It has also brought to light the fact that such situations of absence of vital dependence, 
local underutilization situations, and heterogeneity of users confirm the constructivist 
criticism, that insists on the fact that the definition of "success" or "failure" of a resource 
regime is partly (and sometimes mainly) a result of a process of social and political conflict. 
The difficulties in establishing clear uncontested evaluation criteria for the different hunting 
systems is a direct illustration of this thesis. 
 
4° Finally, the historical overview as well as the succinct statistical analysis of the impacts 
and outcomes of the different systems illustrate interesting potentialities of co-management 
solutions. The renting system, which was progressively introduced during the first part of the 
XXth century in order to limit the number of hunters and contribute to a better protection of 
fauna live-stock, seems in fact to have better capacities to adapt to such radical changes in 
the state of the resource. This is especially so if we accept the hypothesis of present/current 
developments towards resource underutilization. Moreover, it has proved to be able to 
develop a more accurate, flexible and locally differentiated management. 
 
As we can see, the central question that seems to emerge from this analytical overview of the 
case of wildlife management in a western industrialized country like Switzerland deals with 
the lessons that we can draw for the management organization of non vital, partially 
underutilized, common pool resources. 
In my opinion, the answer suggested by the comparison of the three hunting systems goes in 
the direction of the co-management solution following the renting system model. 
Reconsidering this example under this aspect, 7 brief concluding remarks can be made 
concerning the "relevant" distribution of competencies between state administration and 
hunting associations within such a co-management arrangement, thereby tackling the 
question of “how much autonomy should a common pool resource regime have?”: 
 
1° A historical perspective tends to prove that co-management solutions based on a 
particular distribution of competencies between state administration and partly autonomous 
local self-governing associations can be suspected to have a better capacity to adapt to the 
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changes in the state of the resource. This is especially so if we consider the underutilization 
hypothesis to be plausible. Thus, the co-managed solution has the advantage, contrary to the 
centralized (licence) one, of allowing more flexible management, because hunters are used to 
important annual variations of quotas within each affermage. In direct relation with the 
present situation of the local hunting territory, such modifications are more understandable 
and easily accepted by the hunters. Being fragmented into 50 to 150 affermages (depending 
on the state size), these modifications of the quotas allocated to the hunters do not affect 
them in a the same way at the same time and thus have less risk of provoking collective 
opposition towards the status quo. 
 
2° Through the delegation to the hunters of significant responsibilities for implementing a 
number of resource management measures, the renting system has also proved to be able to 
increase the sensitivity of appropriators to the new central policy aim consisting in 
biodiversity protection. The delegation of management responsibility to appropriators during 
a time period sufficiently long (1) to make them feel like the real owners of the resource 
system and (2) that the effects of their individual and collective behavior have visible and 
measurable effects on the resource system, contribute to constrain and/or incite appropriators 
to cooperate in order to conform to the management goals defined at the state level, and 
avoid sanctions on its part. 
 
3° To the extent that these goals, as well as the delegation of responsibility, do not only 
concern the management of fauna live-stock, but also of its living space, co-management 
solution tends to have a better ability to make appropriators attentive to the requirements 
resulting from interpolicy cooperation, and thus renders its local implementation more 
effective. 
 
4° Faced with the particular situation related to the management of a non-vital resource, 
which also tends towards underutilization, the co-management arrangement has the 
advantage of being able to prevent or limit negative effects on the local self-governing 
associations resulting from this situation. Thus, state administration is responsible for using 
different instruments (incentives, constraint, sanctions) in order to preserve or restore the 
conditions for the development of a reciprocal interest and commitment of the members of 
an affermage towards a self-organized implementation of management measures. 
 
5° The existence of a (state) institution centralizing the tasks too difficult or too costly to be 
carried out by local associations constitutes a guarantee that they will not be abandoned. I am 
thinking here more particularly of (1) monitoring of the territories situated outside the 
affermages; (2) the collection of reliable data; (3) their analysis and the production of 
scientific knowledge about the working of the resource system; (4) the decision-making 
process concerning the definition of the hunting plan; (5) organization of cooperation with 
neighboring states; (6) organization of the hunting exams, (7) interpolicy coordination, and, 
finally, (8) resolution of multilevel conflicts between heterogeneous groups of users. 
 
6° The co-management arrangement has the advantage of being strongly in phase with two 
historically central features of the Swiss political system namely: cooperative federalism and 
neo-corporatist practices consisting in the delegation of implementation tasks to non 
administrative, semi-private associations (especially in the domain of environmental and 
nature protection). 
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7° Among the few disadvantages previously mentioned in this paper, the renting system 
faces, however, one really serious problem which is that of the absence of an equal treatment 
of the different groups of appropriators, situated at different levels (local, regional, national 
or even international) concerning their access to the resource. This is a very serious problem, 
especially regarding the question of sustainability: according to the widely accepted 
definition of the term, ecological sustainability is only one component of the whole concept. 
Economic and social sustainability are its two other components. Thus, the most severe 
problem faced by the renting system is, of course, the social aspect of sustainability. In this 
respect, the tendency to favor local appropriators to the detriment of those situated at other 
(regional, national or international) levels is hardly acceptable. That is why one of the 
priorities of this system should be to invent a means of finding an equitable solution to this 
problematic situation. I am strongly convinced that such checks and balances are more likely 
to emerge within the framework of a co-management arrangement allowing the necessary 
state intervention to synergize with the potentialities of a locally efficient implementation. 
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Annex 1 : Hunting data 1968-1998 
 
Renting Licence 
Live-stock Game animals shot  % of game animals shot as 
a proportion of a total live-
stock 
Live-stock Game animals shot % of game animals shot as 
a proportion of a total live-
stock 
Years 
Red-
deer 
Roe Cham
ois 
Red-
deer 
Roe Cham
ois 
Red-
deer 
Roe Cham
ois 
Red-
deer 
Roe Cham
ois 
Red-
deer 
Roe Cham
ois 
Red-
deer 
Roe Cham
ois 
1968 837 51832 5052 216 16452 918 25.8 31.7 18.1 11618 39910 50456 1772 12575 10905 15.2 31.5 21.6 
1969 1122 53597 5636 287 15838 884 25.5 29.5 15.7 11559 42266 49031 1923 12589 10283 16.6 29.8 21.0 
1970 1057 54130 5255 253 16869 797 23.9 31.2 15.2 10823 38445 50105 1358 9242 10024 12.5 24.0 20.0 
1971 925 54540 5740 246 18313 827 26.6 33.6 14.4 11315 43740 52005 1984 10519 9421 17.5 24.0 18.1 
1972 1040 55900 6485 190 19138 827 18.2 34.2 12.8 15390 45285 53830 2384 10384 9805 15.5 22.9 18.2 
1973 1047 54950 6660 304 19911 899 29.0 36.2 13.5 15770 52050 56120 2615 10175 9834 16.6 19.5 17.5 
1974 970 55560 5820 371 20969 794 38.2 37.7 13.6 17680 55560 57220 2919 14976 11487 16.5 26.9 20.1 
1975 1124 55020 6320 286 22503 1288 25.4 40.9 20.4 18500 55040 59220 3266 16874 12070 17.6 30.6 20.4 
1976 1035 54900 6580 359 24168 1393 34.7 44.0 21.2 19470 56830 62930 5190 18089 14208 26.6 31.8 22.6 
1977 1010 55300 6290 447 24879 1530 44.2 45.0 24.3 19130 55470 61220 4032 19101 14112 21.1 34.4 23.0 
1978 976 52875 6105 357 24658 1519 36.5 46.6 24.9 19040 53490 60145 2872 18643 14084 15.1 34.8 23.4 
1979 851 50847 6010 297 23557 1311 34.9 46.3 21.8 19497 52582 68844 3378 21216 13022 17.3 40.3 18.9 
1980 778 51410 6015 298 23912 1195 38.3 46.5 19.8 19690 50680 57555 3799 20046 13623 19.3 39.6 23.7 
1981 850 52330 6445 329 24501 1207 38.7 46.8 18.7 19684 52435 58860 3447 18403 12253 17.5 35.1 20.8 
1982 893 52690 6310 261 24844 1273 29.2 47.1 20.2 20315 53080 59320 3186 19786 13858 15.7 37.3 23.4 
1983 912 53020 7180 262 24778 1224 28.7 46.7 17.0 20615 57670 59940 3570 20002 13043 17.3 34.7 21.8 
1984 1052 52695 7180 321 25166 1337 30.5 47.7 18.6 20995 56150 60720 4387 18365 14056 20.9 32.7 23.1 
1985 1052 52300 7180 325 25062 1414 30.9 47.9 19.7 21192 57000 60310 4485 16539 14321 21.2 29.0 23.7 
1986 1175 50620 7730 366 24534 1557 31.1 48.5 20.1 22390 59370 62885 4998 17207 14050 22.3 29.0 22.3 
1987 1145 46630 7660 400 21775 1643 34.9 46.7 21.4 22295 54890 62630 5945 15964 14801 26.7 29.1 23.6 
1988 1034 42250 8373 549 19606 1626 53.1 46.4 19.4 20663 54107 61518 5665 14267 14504 27.4 26.4 23.6 
1989 963 46034 8575 478 19879 1769 49.6 43.2 20.6 19355 53735 75957 5394 16317 15732 27.9 30.4 20.7 
1990 1584 51457 12399 453 20455 1678 28.6 39.7 13.5 19611 65646 82048 5788 16784 16298 29.5 25.6 19.9 
1991 1481 51810 12352 500 21750 1844 33.8 42.0 14.9 19942 70669 85055 5429 15827 16371 27.2 22.4 19.2 
1992 964 49458 8924 350 22915 1785 36.3 46.3 20.0 17784 65308 82124 5643 17519 16008 31.7 26.8 19.5 
1993 1001 50984 8223 412 23344 2019 41.1 45.8 24.5 19016 65285 83638 5453 17728 16508 28.7 27.1 19.7 
1994 957 51185 9116 395 23092 2198 41.3 45.1 24.1 19064 65875 83343 4981 18326 17354 26.1 27.8 20.8 
1995 838 51211 8802 421 22690 1916 50.2 44.3 21.8 19197 68472 81947 5433 19599 15779 28.3 28.6 19.3 
1996 1106 50484 7952 441 22519 1886 39.9 44.6 23.7 19883 73664 83378 5511 20894 16500 27.7 28.4 19.8 
1997 1049 50766 7786 401 22828 2013 38.2 45.0 25.8 19990 76671 86508 5784 19706 15806 28.9 25.7 18.3 
1998 1029 51318 8628 509 23951 2096 49.5 46.7 24.3 20264 79261 88380 6387 19432 16447 31.5 24.5 18.6 
Source : Ministry of Environment (OFEFP/BUWAL), hunting section; my own calculation 
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